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Renegotiation Versus Brexit: The Question of the UK’s
Constitutional Relationship with the EU*
SOFIA VASILOPOULOU and DAN KEITH
University of York, UK
Abstract
This article examines how the British public perceived UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s plan
to renegotiate his country’s relationship with the EU. It asks whether attitudes towards renegotia-
tion followed a similar pattern to attitudes towards Brexit. It asks: are preferences towards renego-
tiation and Brexit related, and did British citizens perceive them as conflicting or complementary?
We modelled the similarities and differences between these two types of preferences, which
allowed us to classify the attitudes into four patterns: unconditional europhiles, rejectionist
eurosceptics, risk-averse eurosceptics and power-seeking eurosceptics. Using a large-N cross-
sectional survey conducted in the UK in April 2015 (n=3000), our findings suggest that similar
utilitarian concerns underpinned both types of preferences; but education and partisan cues differ-
entiated them. Our findings have implications for understanding the result of the UK referendum.
They also highlight the complex considerations that drive citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and
help us predict the scope of public acceptance of EU reform initiatives by other governments.
Keywords: euroscepticism; public opinion; Brexit; renegotiation
Introduction
In his January 2013 Bloomberg Speech, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron an-
nounced that if his party was re-elected to government following the 2015 general elec-
tion he would renegotiate a new settlement for his country and subsequently hold an
‘in-out’ referendum on its European Union (EU) membership. This was the first time that
a head of government of an EU Member State promised the public a renegotiation of their
country’s constitutional relationship with the EU since the latter was formally founded in
1993. The announcement drew comparisons with the renegotiation of the UK’s European
Economic Community membership in 1974, which was also followed by an in-out refer-
endum. The Conservative Party’s victory in the 2015 general election allowed the prime
minster to renegotiate a new settlement for the UK, granting it special status within the
EU, and paved the way towards a referendum on the UK’s EU membership on 23 June
2016. Cameron’s strategic calculation to promise this renegotiation may be interpreted
as successful, given the public’s apparent initial support for it and his party’s surprise
2015 electoral victory, but at the same time it may be seen as a potential misjudgement
in light of the referendum result in favour of Brexit (Curtice, 2016; Lynch, 2015, p. 199).
In this article we begin unravelling the puzzle of why, given the initial support for a re-
negotiation, Cameron’s strategy failed when the public rejected the renegotiation and voted
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for Brexit. We aim to shed light on the drivers that shaped attitudes towards these two pro-
cesses. More specifically, we make three contributions. First, although scholars have made
advances to understanding EU level negotiations before the UK’s referendum in 2016
(Oppermann, 2016) and voting behaviour during the referendum (Clarke et al., 2017;
Hobolt, 2016), citizens’ attitudes to the renegotiation remain under-researched. We still
do not know how voters perceived Cameron’s renegotiation promise in the first place
and whether there was an initial relationship between individuals’ attitudes towards rene-
gotiation and preferences towards Brexit. Did British citizens view ‘Brexit’ and ‘renegoti-
ation’ as complementary or as different from each other? If they were different, what led
citizens to support or oppose them? By asking these questions we provide a nuanced under-
standing of how the British electorate made sense of a complex political deal and the chal-
lenges Cameron faced in trying to convince a majority of citizens to vote against Brexit.
Second, through our examination of the factors that shaped attitudes towards these two
processes, we contribute to the comparative study of citizen preference formation towards
European integration. We model the similarities but also the differences between these
two types of preferences and show that, although the attitudes towards renegotiation (spe-
cial status within the EU) and Brexit (special status outside the EU) overlap to some ex-
tent, they are distinct enough to allow us to identify four groups of UK citizens, which we
term unconditional europhiles, rejectionist eurosceptics, risk-averse eurosceptics, and
power-seeking eurosceptics.
Third, we posit that renegotiation and Brexit are hard and easy issues, respectively, re-
quiring different cognitive engagement. We find support for the cognitive sophistication
hypothesis. Education levels help explain conflicting preferences towards renegotiation
and Brexit. Highly educated individuals supported renegotiation but opposed Brexit.
We also find that cue-taking was significant. Support for renegotiation was predominantly
found among right-wing party supporters, which suggests that renegotiation gave oppor-
tunities for Cameron to appeal to both Conservative and the UK Independence Party
(UKIP) voters, capitalizing on citizens’ attitudes to the renegotiation.
Brexit remains a unique event, since no other Member State has ever decided to exit
the EU.1 However, the sentiments that led to it are by no means a distinctively British
phenomenon, with eurosceptic and EU-issue-focused entrepreneurs pushing for referen-
dums in states across Europe. Our theoretical approach and classification has the potential
to apply beyond the British context and helps us predict the scope of citizen support for
EU reform initiatives and public acceptance of national government attempts to renegoti-
ate international treaties elsewhere.
The Path to Renegotiation
In 1974 Harold Wilson’s Labour government renegotiated the UK’s terms of membership
of the Common Market and in a referendum a year later a large majority of voters sup-
ported the country remaining in the European Economic Community. However, the UK
remained Europe’s ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1998; Glencross, 2016). Politicians seek-
ing to reform the UK’s relationship with the EU came to pledge more referendums on
European issues. The Thatcher government criticized the direction of European
1Greenland constitutes the only exception, which took place before the official establishment of the EU.
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integration, and in the mid-1990s, under John Major, the Conservative Party took a no-
ticeable shift towards soft eurosceptic positions and promised a referendum should it rec-
ommend joining the single currency (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013a, p. 319). Blair’s ‘New
Labour’ governments showed signs of a positive approach to European integration but
failed to foster a pro-European consensus, as the Conservative leader William Hague em-
braced eurosceptic positions to move his party closer to the median voter (Bale, 2006).
Labour responded by downplaying party competition over European issues. It deferred
to the general public with promises of a referendum should the UK adopt the single cur-
rency or the (failed) European Constitution (Oppermann, 2008, p. 156). As the Conserva-
tive Party’s euroscepticism deepened, Hague’s successors also committed to holding
referendums on future EU treaties, including David Cameron’s pledge to hold a referen-
dum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.
Cameron has been criticized for pursuing an inconsistent strategy on Europe (Lynch
and Whitaker, 2013a). In opposition he sought to lower the salience of Europe and
focused on ‘modernizing’ his party by discussing political and social change (Lynch,
2015). When the Conservatives formed a coalition government in 2010 with the europhile
Liberal Democrats, Cameron pursued a pragmatic strategy and appointed David
Lidington, a pro-European Conservative, as Minister of State for Europe (Baldini,
2012). However, the sovereign debt crisis and the Conservative Party’s loss of support
to UKIP at the 2010 general election contributed to a hardening of euroscepticism among
Conservative MPs (Heppell, 2013, p. 347). In response to these pressures, Cameron
followed the well-trodden path of considering referendums on European integration
(Lynch and Whitaker, 2013b). In 2011 the coalition passed the European Act that pledged
a referendum on future European treaties.
In January 2013 Cameron attempted to manage intra-party conflicts by announcing
that if his party were to win the general election in 2015 he would renegotiate the UK’s
terms of EU membership and put the outcome to the electorate in an in-out referendum
(Startin, 2018, p. 456). The renegotiation appeared to be a carbon copy of the promise that
Wilson made in 1974. Scholars noted that Cameron’s strategy might provide an advan-
tage in general elections, given the popularity of reforming the UK’s relationship with
the EU, and if voters concluded that only the Conservatives could deliver a renegotiation
and referendum (Smith, 2016). In 2013 opinion polls also suggested that a majority of re-
spondents would vote to remain in the EU should Cameron renegotiate the UK’s terms of
membership (Lynch, 2015).
Consistent with his Bloomberg speech, Cameron (2015) outlined four objectives for
the renegotiation based in areas of economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty
and immigration. To this end, Cameron called for the limited repatriation of powers from
Brussels, rights for Parliament to block EU legislation, guarantees that the UK could ac-
cess the single market while remaining outside the eurozone, continued independence for
the Bank of England in regulating the UK’s financial system, and assurances that
British taxpayers would not be liable to support the Euro as a currency. Perhaps most con-
tentious were Cameron’s calls to limit migration when countries join the EU and for re-
strictions on the rights of EU migrants to claim welfare benefits (Lynch, 2015).
The agreement reached with European Council President Donald Tusk in February 2016
met some of Cameron’s demands. He delivered an exemption from the commitment to an
‘ever closer union’, increased the powers of national parliaments and made some progress
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in calls for cutting red tape to promote competitiveness within the EU through reducing the
burden of regulation (Lynch, 2015; Smith, 2016). The deal proposed a temporary require-
ment that EU citizens should live in another Member State for 4 years before having full
access to welfare benefits; although it fell short of Cameron’s goal of ending the practice
of sending child benefits overseas (Curtice, 2017). Overall, Cameron’s new settlement did
not satisfy influential Conservative politicians and was widely criticized in the British press,
and ultimately featured very little during the referendum campaign (Hobolt, 2016).
However, we still do not know how, prior to the actual renegotiation outcome, voters
perceived Cameron’s renegotiation promise in the first place and whether there was
initially a relationship between individuals’ attitudes towards renegotiation and their pref-
erences towards Brexit. It remains unclear as to whether voters viewed the two processes
as conflicting or complementary and what factors shaped attitudes towards them. We
explore these questions in the following sections.
A Model for Explaining Public Attitudes Towards EU Renegotiation and Brexit
We explain opinions on these two different aspects of the UK’s constitutional relationship
with the EU by drawing upon scholarly work on euroscepticism, which has focused on at
least two main approaches; namely, identity and utilitarianism (Hobolt and de Vries,
2016). To do so, we modelled the common drivers of public opinion towards these two
processes, while at the same time accounting for heterogeneity in citizens’ preferences.
Political Identities
Identity theories posit that as the pace of EU integration increases, citizens may feel that their
long-standing national identities are being challenged (for example, Carey, 2002; McLaren,
2004). Individuals who strongly identify with the nation-state and feel a strong bond with
their community may view European integration as a threat to their identity. Conversely,
their attachment to Europe may act as a buffer against hostility towards the EU (Wessels,
2007). We expected these emotive ties to have the same effect both on attitudes towards
Brexit and renegotiation. Identity concerns related to the UK’s relationship with the EU have
been ascribed to a number of explanations, including the country’s island location, imperial
past, and attachment to the Anglo-American world (George, 1998). Being part of the EU has
long been seen as an encroachment on national sovereignty and the UK Parliament’s su-
preme legal authority. The Conservative party also employed a sovereignty-based rhetoric
by presenting its renegotiation agenda as a plan for defending British sovereignty and the
principle of subsidiarity vis-à-vis the EU’s attempt to build an ‘ever closer political union’.
We thus hypothesize: Weak political attachment to Europe is likely to be associated with
support for both Brexit and renegotiation (H1).
Economic Self-interest
Given the EU’s strong emphasis on economic prosperity, scholars have also focused on
whether public support for European integration is influenced by rational calculations
(Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel, 1998). Individuals may base their preferences on
cost–benefit analyses of European integration. EU membership involves both winners
and losers. While market liberalization associated with EU integration introduces
Renegotiation versus Brexit 489
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
opportunities for some citizens, it also increases competition for others. The extent to
which an individual may perceive EU integration as an opportunity or a threat depends
on their socioeconomic status. Citizens with high incomes and in highly skilled, manage-
rial or professional positions may see a strong personal potential benefit in liberalized
markets in goods, capital and labour. These individuals also tend to be more mobile
and thus more likely to gain from EU freedom of movement. Conversely citizens in
low-paid and low-skilled jobs tend to be less well equipped to adjust to competitiveness
in an international marketplace and are more likely to contest the removal of national bor-
ders. Being the losers of economic transformations, these individuals are likely to view
European integration as a source of insecurity and threat (Kriesi et al., 2006). We also
suggest that similar cost-benefit calculations influence public opinion towards Brexit
(Hobolt, 2016), and expect that Low skilled individuals with lower incomes who perceive
they will have limited benefits from international cooperation are more likely to support
Brexit (H2a).
This approach may also help us understand attitudes towards renegotiation, as
Cameron’s EU reform agenda had a strong economic component. In his 2013 Bloomberg
speech he laid out his plan for safeguarding British economic interests related to the single
market, competitiveness and red tape. His vision was to broker international trade agree-
ments that would boost global trade and complete the single market in services. Renego-
tiation also involved a stipulation that the UK would not be committed to contributing to
Eurozone bailouts, which was framed as a key economic opportunity that would decrease
the costs of EU membership. Therefore, we hypothesize that, assuming that they would
expect to derive some economic benefit from this process: Citizens who view their
country’s membership in terms of cost are more likely to seek renegotiation (H2b).
Cameron’s renegotiation not only was justified as a move to defend UK economic
interests abroad but also as a means of reducing the welfare costs of EU migration on
the British state. We therefore hypothesize that individuals with low occupational skills
are likely to support renegotiation (H2c).
given that such citizens tend to feel economically insecure (Walter, 2010) and are more
likely to perceive immigration as a threat to their welfare (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012).
The relationship between income and attitudes to renegotiation is inconclusive. People
with low incomes may expect an economic benefit from renegotiation and thus support
it; at the same time individuals with high incomes may also see an economic opportunity
in a new renegotiated UK status in the EU, especially given that renegotiation would not
compromise their status quo.
The above hypotheses provide a good starting point in explaining whether individuals
would support or oppose both the processes of renegotiation and Brexit. However, they
do not help to explain why some individuals may support renegotiation but oppose Brexit
and vice versa. To explain this, we consider the different nature of the two issues and the
role of individuals’ cognitive abilities and of cues in processing EU-related complexity
during their decision-making calculus.
Renegotiation versus Brexit: Political Sophistication and Cues
Research differentiates between easy and hard political issues (Carmines and Stimson,
1980; Johnston and Wronski, 2015; Pollock et al., 1993). Easy issues have been on the
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political agenda a long time, tend to be symbolic rather than technical in nature, and can
be easily communicated to the wider public. They tend to be rooted in existing prejudices
and are more likely to elicit ‘gut responses’. Making up one’s mind on an easy issue is
relatively straightforward because easy issues are more general and ends-oriented, that
is, they relate to public policy ends rather than dealing with the means to achieve these
ends. Hard issues, on the other hand, tend to be ‘more difficult for individuals to tie to
core values’ (Pollock et al., 1993, p. 29) because they are technical and involve special-
ized knowledge. Deciding on a hard political issue therefore is the result of a reasoned at-
tempt at understanding the issue in question and a sophisticated decision-making
calculus, which require advanced cognitive skills.
We argue that whereas Brexit may be thought of as an easy issue, the question of re-
negotiation is a hard political issue. Brexit relates to policy ends, namely, leaving the EU,
as opposed to policy means, which refer to an assessment of the different ways in which a
country may achieve secession from the EU, as well as its political, social and economic
implications. In addition, because the question of the UK leaving the EU has long fea-
tured in public and media debates in the UK, citizens might feel a level of familiarity with
the issue, which is more likely to elicit affective responses (Vasilopoulou and Wagner,
2017). On the other hand, although Cameron’s renegotiation had a strong symbolic ele-
ment, as it represented his attempt to empower the UK by driving EU reform, in substance
the issue is technical, involving a number of specific policies ranging from bureaucracy,
trade and access to markets, competitiveness, immigration and the functioning of the EU
regime. It is therefore hard to predict its real impact on the national economy and individ-
uals’ well-being, including their job prospects, incomes and purchasing power.
We posit that these substantive differences between the two types of issues may result
in different cognitive processes taking place during the process of preference formation,
with individuals’ cognitive abilities serving to differentiate citizens’ attitudes towards
Brexit and renegotiation. On the one hand, the symbolic and ends-oriented character of
Brexit could be a simple choice for individuals and one that does not necessitate a high
level of ‘cognitive mobilisation’ (Inglehart, 1970). Individuals with low levels of educa-
tion are more likely to prefer demarcation (Kriesi et al., 2006), and thus support the clos-
ing of borders and their country’s exit from the EU. Making a conscious calculation of the
costs and benefits derived from renegotiation, on the other hand, requires a level of so-
phistication in order to organize and process such information. Educated individuals are
more likely to make a reasoned and thoughtful attempt to engage with the specificities
of renegotiation and perceive the potential benefits or costs arising from it (Hakhverdian
et al., 2013). A successful renegotiation potentially promises to improve the UK’s status
in the EU both in terms of power and in economic terms; but given that renegotiation is a
non-costly process, an unsuccessful one is unlikely to compromise the status quo. We
thus hypothesize that educational level is negatively associated with support for Brexit
but positively associated with support for renegotiation (H3).
Heuristics also may play a role in shaping citizen preferences, helping the public to
process information by simplifying the decision-making process. The literature suggests
that elite positions may be employed as information shortcuts, influencing voters’ prefer-
ences (Anderson, 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). Applied to the questions of renegotia-
tion and Brexit, we suggest that different partisan cues may be stronger in each issue.
Brexit, being an easy issue, may be attached to citizens’ core values and beliefs, which
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are also associated with their attitudes towards domestic elites (Hobolt and De Vries,
2016). UKIP and the Liberal Democrats have consistently been eurosceptic and europhile
UK voices, respectively, sending clear cues to the electorate. The Conservative and La-
bour parties have been historically divided over the question of Europe. In fact,
Cameron’s promise to hold a referendum on Europe may be understood as an attempt
to end internal party conflict on the EU issue (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013b). And, while
the Labour party under Tony Blair initially sought to put forward a pro-EU stance, the
party’s EU position has been characterized as an attempt to contain the salience of the
EU issue (Hertner and Keith, 2016; Oppermann, 2008). Given that their messages have
been contradictory and often ambiguous, they are also unlikely to influence their voters
in a coherent manner. We expect therefore that attitudes towards domestic elites matter,
with UKIP voters more likely to support Brexit and Liberal Democrat voters more likely
to oppose the same process (H4a). However, the hard nature of renegotiation makes it dif-
ficult for voters to understand where political parties stand, and even harder in a context
where political parties did not necessarily have an EU reform plan in their agendas; or if
they did, as arguably in the case of the Labour party, it did not coincide with the Conser-
vative party’s plan. The decision to renegotiate and the specific reform plan was explicitly
tied to the Conservative party’s deepening euroscepticism and in particular to the issues
that Cameron was talking about at the time (mentioned in the previous section). We thus
hypothesize that Conservative party voters are more likely to express support for renego-
tiation (H4b).
Our theoretical discussion above has suggested that if voters view the processes of re-
negotiation and Brexit as complementary then the same model related to identity and eco-
nomic self-interest would serve to explain these attitudes. However, we have argued that
Brexit and renegotiation are easy and hard political issues, respectively. We thus expect
that there is scope for responses to these two questions not to overlap (Figure 1; see also
Hobolt, 2014; Karp and Bowler, 2006).
The principal diagonal of Figure 1 presents preferences towards the two processes as
complementary. Unconditional europhiles oppose both Brexit and renegotiation. The fact
that they do not even wish to renegotiate the UK’s EU membership qualifies them as un-
conditional. The logic behind opposition to renegotiation may involve acceptance of
membership, or the opinion that an EU Member State should try to reform the EU by con-
stant cooperation rather than putting forward specific red lines. Power-seeking
eurosceptics, on the other hand, support both renegotiation and Brexit. These citizens per-
ceive renegotiation as an opportunity to reassert the UK’s power and influence before
leaving the EU or feel that the best option is to exhaust all possibilities before taking
Figure 1: Citizen Preferences on the UK’s Constitutional Relationship with the EU.
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drastic action, in order for the country to appear rational or orderly before ultimately
changing its relationship with the EU through Brexit. The counter-diagonal illustrates cit-
izen attitudes as conflicting. Rejectionist eurosceptics do not seek renegotiation but sup-
port Brexit. These citizens express an outright rejection of EU membership and do not
view renegotiation as something that could change the UK’s status within (or outside)
the EU. Risk-averse eurosceptics are unhappy with the status quo and therefore support
renegotiation as a potentially promising route to reforming the EU, but these citizens per-
ceive Brexit as a risky option and therefore oppose it (this is akin to soft euroscepticism).
We posit that identity and utilitarianism drive citizen support for or opposition to both
processes (unconditional europhiles and power-seeking eurosceptics). However, voters
are also likely to distinguish between the two processes (rejectionist and risk-averse
eurosceptics). We postulate that these conflicting preferences may be explained through
individuals’ political sophistication and cue-taking.
Methods and Data
We rely on data collected from a large-N cross-sectional online survey (n=3000) con-
ducted in April 2015, prior to the 2015 UK general election. The survey was administered
by Research Now.2 Participants were recruited using a variety of actively managed online
access panels. All participants were exposed to the survey in the same way. Informed con-
sent was obtained through a disclaimer on the first page of the survey, which explained its
purpose and ensured their anonymity. The sample is representative of the UK population
in terms of gender, age and region (Appendix Table A.1). While online surveys tend not
to be fully representative of the general population, online and face-to-face survey data
tend to yield similar results both in terms of estimating coefficients and the overall predic-
tive power of rival models (Sanders et al., 2007). The timing of the survey is ideal for test-
ing the above expectations. First, given that Cameron tied his re-election campaign to
renegotiation, this question featured prominently in public and media debates during that
time. Second, the survey took place prior to both the renegotiation outcome and the
referendum campaign, which arguably changed the context of preference formation.
The timing allows us to tap into the formative stage of the discussions over the issue
rather than predict vote choice in the referendum, which is outside the scope of this
article.
For the outcome variables, we considered responses to the following two agree-
disagree statements: (1) the UK should renegotiate the terms of its EU membership;
and (2) irrespective of renegotiation, the UK should leave the EU. Responses to both
questions were measured on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree). Public opinion towards renegotiation tends to be supportive
(mean=5.19; median=5) whereas preferences towards Brexit tend to be spread out
(mean=3.82; median=4) (appendix Figure A.1).
To measure EU attachment (H1), we employed the agree-disagree question: ‘You
think of yourself as European’, with scores ranging from one to seven, with higher values
indicating weak attachment to Europe. We operationalized economic self-interest (H2)
2For information on the company’s profile and policies, see online at: http://sigs.researchnow.com/EU_Emails/UK/14Apr/
Panel%20IE%20Landing%20Page/ESOMAR_28_IE.pdf. Last accessed 3 July 2018.
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with reference to income, occupation skill and perceived benefit of EU membership. We
relied on respondents’ self-reported household income measured on a scale ranging from
1=under £10,000 to 14=£500,000 or more. We also included an occupation dummy for
manual workers (skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled), with those working in professional
and managerial positions as the reference category. Perceptions of EU membership
(H2) were measured through the agree-disagree statement ‘The UK has greatly benefited
from being a member of the EU’, with scores ranging from one to seven, with higher
values indicating lower perceived benefits. Educational level (H3) was measured from
one to four, with 1 indicating ‘less than secondary school-leaving exams’, 2 ‘secondary
school-leaving exams (such as GCSEs or equivalent)’, 3 ‘college entrance exams (such
as A-levels, National Vocational Qualification, or equivalent)’ and 4 ‘university (such
as a degree or professional qualifications)’. To test the effect of party cues (H4) our
models included a variable indicating how likely participants were to vote for each of
these parties in the 2015 general election, including the Conservative, Labour, Liberal
Democrat parties and UKIP (PTV=propensity to vote).
We controlled for a number of potential confounders. Research has shown that negative
out-group bias in the form of intolerance and anti-immigration sentiment can be a strong
predictor of opposition to the EU (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005). We controlled
for anti-immigration feelings using the agree-disagree statement ‘The UK should have a
restrictive policy on immigration’, with scores ranging from one to seven, with higher
values denoting anti-immigrant feelings. The literature also suggests that there is a rela-
tionship between citizens’ evaluations of the political system and their attitudes towards
the EU (Anderson, 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). We controlled for citizen satisfaction
with the way democracy works in the UK and the EU. Responses to both questions are
coded from one to ten, with higher values denoting satisfaction. A control was used for
self-placement on the left–right dimension, although there is no clear relationship between
left–right political views and EU position in the literature (Marks and Steenbergen, 2002).
Finally, other individual-level controls included age, gender and media use (TV, the inter-
net and newspapers) (see Appendix Table A.2 on the descriptive statistics).
Findings
Table 1 shows the broad patterns of preferences on renegotiation and Brexit by mapping
respondents’ answers to the two questions on the basis of the 2×2 framework presented
in Figure 1. As answers to these questions are coded on a seven-point scale we have not
recoded the middle neutral category, which appears on the table as ‘not sure’. Table 1
Table 1: Renegotiation versus Leave Preferences
Do not leave Not sure Leave Total
Do not renegotiate 8.28 0.85 2.35 11.48
Not sure 10.29 9.23 2.28 21.8
Renegotiate 23.4 14.51 28.81 66.72
Total 41.96 24.59 33.45 100
Source: Data from original survey of 3000 respondents conducted in the period 23 April 2015–5 May 2015.
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shows that prior to the UK 2015 general election there was greater support for renegoti-
ation than for leaving the EU, at 66.7 and 33.4 per cent, respectively. In other words, at
that time, the question of renegotiation resonated with a large majority of British citizens,
almost double the number of those who wanted to leave the EU. We start by discussing
the two groups of individuals who viewed the processes of renegotiation and Brexit as
complementary. On the one hand, the percentage of unconditional europhiles, that is,
those who were against both renegotiation and Brexit, was very small at approximately
8.3 per cent. On the other hand, power-seeking eurosceptics, who supported both renego-
tiation and Brexit, were the group with the highest number of respondents at approxi-
mately 29 per cent. Citizens who viewed these two processes as conflicting include the
very small category of rejectionist eurosceptics, that is, the individuals who did not
support renegotiation but wanted to leave the EU, at approximately 2.35 per cent of re-
spondents; and the risk-averse eurosceptics, namely the individuals who supported rene-
gotiation but opposed Brexit, at 23.4 per cent. Approximately 37 per cent of respondents
were unsure about both processes.
We explore variations in the attitudes towards the two processes through ordered
logistic regression analyses (Table 2). We estimate two models of support for renegotia-
tion and Brexit, which allow us to compare the drivers of these two types of preferences.
Answers to the two questions are positively correlated, which suggests some complemen-
tarity, but the correlation is modest (0.38), which indicates that there is scope for hetero-
geneous opinion formation (Hobolt, 2014). While weak European identity is positively
associated with support for renegotiation, it is not statistically related to support for
Table 2: Determinants of Attitudes towards Renegotiation and Brexit
Renegotiate EU membership Leave the EU
Weak European identity (1–7) 0.114*** (0.026) 0.0352 (0.026)
The UK has not benefited from EU membership (1–7) 0.189*** (0.034) 0.919*** (0.038)
Income (1–14) 0.0109 (0.016) 0.0422*** (0.016)
Manual worker 0.0355 (0.091) 0.245*** (0.092)
Education (1–4) 0.132*** (0.050) 0.123** (0.050)
PTV: Conservative (0–10) 0.0599*** (0.013) 0.00436 (0.013)
PTV: Labour (0–10) 0.0172 (0.012) 0.00604 (0.012)
PTV: LibDem (0–10) 0.0330** (0.013) 0.0235* (0.014)
PTV: UKIP (0–10) 0.0441*** (0.013) 0.198*** (0.014)
Satisfaction with UK democracy (0–10) 0.182*** (0.021) 0.0608*** (0.020)
Satisfaction with EU democracy (0–10) 0.239*** (0.022) 0.0392* (0.021)
Left–right self-placement (0–10) 0.003200 (0.023) 0.0625*** (0.023)
Restrictive immigration policy (1–7) 0.279*** (0.029) 0.220*** (0.029)
Age 0.00922*** (0.003) 0.0123*** (0.003)
Male 0.209*** (0.078) 0.190** (0.079)
Media use (TV, the internet and newspapers) 0.122*** (0.031) 0.0744** (0.032)
Constant 0.114*** (0.026) 0.0352 (0.026)
Observations 2580 2580
McFadden’s pseudo-R
2
0.1235 0.2403
Log likelihood 3865.9929 3730.0205
Notes: Results from ordered logistic regression analysis. Ordered log-odds regression coefficients are reported. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. The estimated cut points are not reported. * P< 0.10, ** P< 0.05, *** P< 0.01
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Brexit. This partially supports H1, which suggests that weak political attachment to
Europe is likely to be associated with support for both Brexit and renegotiation. While
Cameron’s renegotiation plan was perceived as a question of identity, Brexit was not per-
ceived as such prior to the start of the campaign (regarding identity and the referendum,
see Curtice, 2017).
We find support for the utilitarian hypothesis, as perceived cost from membership is
associated with support for both Brexit and renegotiation. Skill, however, is only associ-
ated with support for Brexit, with manual workers more likely to be in favour of their
country leaving the EU compared with individuals in professional and managerial posi-
tions. As expected, income only has an effect on support for Brexit, with citizens with
higher income being less likely to seek this constitutional change for their country. In line
with our expectations, it does not have an effect on support for renegotiation. We argued
that renegotiation is unlikely to compromise the economic status quo of the country, and
as a result it may be seen as an economic opportunity for individuals with different levels
of wealth. In short, our findings support H2a and H2b but fail to support H2c.
In line with our hypothesis, educational level is negatively associated with support for
Brexit but positively associated with support for renegotiation (H3). This entails that
while individuals with high levels of sophistication did not support a change of the
country’s constitutional relationship with the EU, they were able to understand the com-
plexity of renegotiation and perceived the potential benefits of such a process. Finally, our
analyses support our expectations on political party cues (H4a and H4b). The individuals
Table 3: Drivers of Support for Renegotiation but not Brexit
Risk-averse eurosceptics
Weak European identity (1–7) 0.0606 (0.042)
The UK has not benefited from EU membership (1–7) 0.568*** (0.055)
Income (1–14) 0.0153 (0.025)
Manual worker 0.290* (0.156)
Educational level (1–4) 0.179** (0.084)
PTV: Conservative (0–10) 0.0855*** (0.021)
PTV: Labour (0–10) 0.00232 (0.020)
PTV: LibDem (0–10) 0.00355 (0.021)
PTV: UKIP (0–10) 0.178*** (0.023)
Satisfaction with UK democracy (0–10) 0.0608* (0.032)
Satisfaction with EU democracy (0–10) 0.129*** (0.033)
Left–right self-placement (0–10) 0.0293 (0.037)
Restrictive immigration policy (1–7) 0.110** (0.045)
Age 0.00433 (0.004)
Male 0.130 (0.127)
Media use (TV, internet and newspapers) 0.0327 (0.055)
Constant 0.962 (0.655)
Observations 1575
McFadden’s R
2
0.1977
Log likelihood 844.62244
Notes: Results from logistic regression analysis. Dependent variable: 1 risk-averse (support renegotiation but oppose Brexit)
0 unconditional europhiles and power-seeking eurosceptics (support or oppose both processes). Those in the middle of the
scales were excluded from the analysis. Logistic regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
* P< 0.10, ** P< 0.05, *** P< 0.01
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who were likely to vote for UKIP in the 2015 general election were also more likely to
support Brexit. The opposite relationship is observed for Liberal Democrat voters who
opposed Brexit. In line with our expectation, Conservative and Labour party cues were
not clear to the voters, and thus did not have a statistically significant effect on public
preferences towards Brexit. The question of renegotiation, on the other hand, found sup-
port among Conservative party voters. Interestingly, we also find that UKIP supporters
backed renegotiation whereas Liberal Democrat voters did not. UKIP and Liberal Demo-
crat voters fell neatly into the power-seeking eurosceptic and unconditional europhile cat-
egories, respectively. Crucially, and in line with our argument, a propensity to vote for the
Labour party does not have a statistically significant effect on support for renegotiation.
This suggests that these voters could have interpreted it as a ‘Tory’ renegotiation that
would not necessarily focus on Labour’s core issues, like social justice, and as such they
did not have a clear preference on the initiative. It is also plausible that this was driven by
a lack of willingness to support the Conservative party.
Next, we assess the conflicting nature of the two types of attitudes towards renegotia-
tion and Brexit. We do so by specifically testing our hypotheses on the risk-averse group
of eurosceptics, that is, those who wanted to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the
EU but did not want the country to leave the EU. Table 3 presents a logistic regression
model where the dependent variable takes a binary form, with 1 denoting individuals
who have conflicting attitudes, that is, they support renegotiation but oppose Brexit,
and 0 indicating those who have complementary preferences; namely, they support or op-
pose both processes (unconditional europhiles and power-seeking eurosceptics). Our find-
ings suggest that it is economic self-interest rather than identity that determines whether
individuals would support renegotiation but oppose Brexit. Those who perceived the
country’s membership in terms of cost were less likely to be risk-averse eurosceptics. A
similar relationship holds for manual workers. Crucially, and confirming our hypotheses
H4a and H4b educational level and Conservative party support matter. First, individuals
with high levels of cognitive sophistication are more likely to see the potential benefits of
a renegotiation agenda, and thus support it, but at the same time perceive Brexit to be a
risk. Second, Conservative voters are more likely to be risk-averse eurosceptics, suggest-
ing that by and large, at that time, these citizens were convinced about the utility of
Cameron’s EU reform plan, which may also go some way to explaining the unprece-
dented 2015 general electoral result for the party. UKIP voters seemed to be unconvinced
about the utility of negotiation if that was not also associated with Brexit.
Discussion
Our findings contribute to our understanding of attitudes towards the EU in the UK by re-
vealing that there were stark divides related not just to support for Brexit (Clarke et al.,
2017; Curtice, 2016; Hobolt, 2016) but also Cameron’s renegotiation. We show that sim-
ilar utilitarian concerns related to the benefits arising from EU membership underpinned
attitudes to both renegotiation and Brexit; but educational level and partisan cues differ-
entiated them. Although it is plausible that educated voters may have viewed Cameron’s
renegotiation as a political stunt, our findings indicate that, in fact, they were more likely
to support renegotiation. These results confirmed our expectation that renegotiation and
Brexit are respectively hard and easy political issues, requiring different cognitive
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processes during the process of preference formation. Educated voters were more likely to
grasp and understand the question of renegotiation, which was a complicated issue that
required a nuanced understanding of diplomacy and public policy.
Support for renegotiation in 2015 was found among Conservative and UKIP sup-
porters. Therefore, Cameron had an opportunity to appeal to Conservative voters but also
branch out to UKIP supporters. However, he also faced significant challenges in winning
support for the renegotiation from less educated citizens and supporters of other political
parties, especially Labour and Liberal Democrat voters. Cameron faced a greater chal-
lenge than Harold Wilson had done in 1974 to win support for his renegotiation. Euro-
pean integration meant that a renegotiation had become a much harder issue for citizens
to understand. While Wilson had support from the majority of the opposition Conserva-
tive voters and a pro-EU media landscape, Cameron found that the Labour Party’s criti-
cism of the renegotiation and low-key support for EU membership, coupled with media
criticism of the renegotiation, did little to assist him (Smith, 2016, p. 4).
Our findings have further implications for understanding the result of the 2015 UK
general election and why the referendum failed to deliver the result that Cameron wanted.
Our findings help to resolve this puzzle in two ways. First, they highlight the fact that the
initial support for renegotiation hid the reality that a significant proportion of voters
wanted a renegotiation followed by Brexit, and were thus unlikely to be convinced of
the results of a renegotiation. Second, our findings suggest that voters perceived the
attempt to renegotiate the UK’s EU membership in terms of utility. This chimes with
findings that suggest there has been a rise in self-interest (Evans and Chzhen, 2013) in
shaping voting behaviour in the UK in recent elections. As Startin (2018, p. 459) notes,
the Remain camp ran a single issue campaign around a rational choice argument that
was unsuccessful. While this may have seemed to be a shrewd strategy, when voters
were so concerned about the perceived costs of EU membership, it was a major challenge
to convince them that the UK had gained significant results from renegotiation. Ulti-
mately, only a minority of voters thought the renegotiation had achieved this and, as
Curtice (2016) notes, the process may have encouraged more voters to vote leave than
remain.
Finally, our findings have implications for the wider study of attitudes towards Euro-
pean integration and international organizations beyond the UK. Cameron’s renegotiation
is not simply an isolated event, given that politicians are calling for renegotiations of EU
membership in a number of Member States. Future research is needed to examine the ap-
plicability of our typology of attitudes towards renegotiation in other EU Member States
and in studying attitudes to renegotiating international treaties in other contexts, such as
the USA. Our findings support the cognitive sophistication hypothesis, which asserts that
renegotiations are hard issues (being both complex and technical) which highly educated
individuals are more likely to grasp and engage with. If national government and EU re-
form initiatives are less likely to find support among less educated voters, then political
elites may encounter a need to simplify the concepts behind them in order to appeal to
the wider electorate. Alternatively, politicians may have reason to present renegotiations
along partisan lines. Here, future research should focus on the role of the media in medi-
ating such complex issues as well as the costs and benefits of EU membership to different
sections of the electorate. According to the benchmark theory (De Vries, 2017), events
related to Brexit may be used as a point of comparison influencing public opinion on
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the EU among voters residing in different EU Member States. Further research is there-
fore needed to investigate whether educational levels shape citizenship awareness and
knowledge of the UK’s renegotiation elsewhere.
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